In this article, we study a popularity function for the French popularity political parties (1981Q2-2014Q4). We suppose that voters have a retrospective behaviour according to the responsibility hypothesis and we study if voters are naive or sophisticated. We show that, the unemployment rate has a significant influence on the popularity of the French political parties (closed economy, opened economy). We do not clearly show the interest for taking into account the openess of the economy. We also found unfavourable results for the asymmetry hypothesis. Then, we found slightly favourable results for the sophisticated voters hypothesis (assuming that voters distinguish trends and cycles for each economic variables). For the political variables, we show the significant influence of the honeymoon effect, the second order elections (regional or European), and the congresses of the Socialist party.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1970s and the first articles of Mueller (1970) for the United States (popularity of the American president) and of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) for Great Britain (popularity of the British political parties), numerous studies showed the significant influence of the economic situation on the popularity of the President and the political parties. It is a subject of research for the public choice school. 1 The popularity functions allow us to explain the popularity of those in power (President, Prime Minister) and the political parties. They have an economic part and a political part. The most used economic variables are the rates of inflation and unemployment. 2 The GNP or GDP real growth and the gross disposable household income are also used. Generally, economic variables depend on the economic situation (objective measure), but they can possibly depend on the perception of the economic situation by voters (subjective measure). Political variables can depend on election cycles: honeymoon effect or depreciation of the popularity (the popularity of those in power is high after an election or an appointment, and then regularly decreases), the personality of those in power (personal factors). Frey and Schneider (1978) , notably, used a variable taking into account the depreciation of popularity for each American President. International events, 3 wars (as the Vietnam war for the United States) or domestic events (as the Watergate scandal for the United States) can have an influence on the popularity of those in power. The political context can also have an influence on the popularity of those in power. Finally, political variables can depend on economic policy decisions. Generally speaking, as highlighted by Nannestad and Paldam (1994) , the economic part of the popularity functions is better studied than the political one; furthermore, the popularity functions are rather unstable over time. 4 There were also for France some studies showing the significant influence of the economic situation and of political variables on the French President's and Prime Minister's popularity and on the popularity of French political parties. 5 In this article, we build, and estimate popularity functions for the French political parties over the 1981Q2-2014Q4 period (quarterly data). For the first estimations (tables 1 to 3), we suppose that voters have a retrospective behaviour according to the responsibility hypothesis and we study if voters are naive or sophisticated. We show that, when voters don't take into account the global economic situation (voters are naive and behave as in a closed economy), the unemployment rate (level, quarterly change, annual change), has a significant influence on the popularity of the French political parties. In an open economy by taking account the openness of the economy, we obtain significant results with the annual change in the unemployment rate. We also put in evidence a significant influence for the annual change of the economic growth. We also found unfavourable results for the asymmetry hypothesis (tables 4 and 5). Then, we showed that voters are sophisticated assuming that voters distinguish trend and cycles for each economic variables (tables 6 to 8). For the political variables, we show the significant positive influence of the honeymoon effect, the significant negative influence of some second order elections (regional or European elections), the significant negative influence of some congresses of the Socialist party.
1 Mueller (2003) made a complete and updated presentation of public choice; we shall notably find in this book a synthesis of the influence of the various economic variables on the popularity of those in power and of the political parties for several countries. 2 We mostly use their lagged variables, that is the previous data to the surveys' poll institutes. 3 Mueller (1970) used a "rally round the flag" variable. 4 According to Lafay (1981) , the bad specification of these functions and, in particular, political variables is a cause of this instability. 5 We present in section 2 a suvey about some articles on the popularity functions built for France. Bélanger (2004) reviews the data for vote and popularity functions in France.
The article is organized as follows. After presenting the empirical results for France, we present the popularity function, the economy and voters' behaviour. Next, we present some estimations (closed / open economy) for the popularity function of the French political parties over the 1981Q2-2014Q4 period. We also study the asymmetry hypothesis (unfavourable results). Then, we show that the results are very slightly more satisfactory by assuming that voters are sophisticated.
Empirical results for France
We notice that articles mainly concerned the government's popularity (the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister). Most authors supposed that voters behave according to the reward/punishment model of Key (1966) by judging absolutely economic performance of the government and by taking into account current or very recent economic performance or by attaching more importance to recent economic performance. 6 In many studies on the President's and Prime Minister's popularity, unemployment (the unemployment rate or number of unsatisfied job applications) was a significant economic variable. For example, Lewis-Beck (1980) showed the significant negative influence of the unemployment figures on the President's and Prime Minister's popularity (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) and Gerstlé and François (2011) showed the the significant negative influence of unemployment on the President's popularity . We note that Courbis (1995) did not show a significant influence of unemployment on the President's popularity; on the other hand, Courbis (1995) showed the significant negative influence of unemployment on the Prime Minister's popularity . For the 1960-1983 period, inflation (the inflation rate or its change) was a significant economic variable. For example, Lafay (1977 Lafay ( , 1981 showed the significant negative influence of the quarterly inflation rate on the Prime Minister's popularity. On the other hand, in Courbis (1995) , for the period 1971-1994, the inflation was not taken into account because its influence was not significant. Indeed, since the middle of the 1980s, the inflation was controled in France. Other economic variables were used as real disposable income growth by Lafay (1984) and real wages by Lecaillon (1984) because voters were sensitive to the evolution of their purchasing power. Lafay (1984) also showed that the exchange rate francs per dollar had a significant influence on the President's popularity. Hellwig (2007) used international economic variables and showed the positive influence of trade or capital flows (measure of economic openness) in the variance equation of the President's popularity; on the other hand, these two international economic variables were not significant in the mean equation (GARCH model). We note that Lafay and Servais (2000) did not use economic variables in their study on the popularity of the parties.
Subjective economic variables were also used. Hellwig (2007) showed the significant influence of personal forward-looking evaluations on the President's popularity (GARCH model, mean equation), Bellucci and Lewis-Beck (2010) showed the significant influence of forward-looking evaluations for the national economic situation on the Prime Minister's popularity and Boya et al. (2010) showed the influence of household confidence on the popularity of the President, Prime Minister and party in government.
Political variables can be dependent on the electoral cycle. Boya et al. (2010) used a honeymoon variable for the popularity of the President, Prime Minister and the party in government (honeymoon variable common to all Presidents or to all Prime Ministers). Dummy variables taking into account Prime Minister's changes for the honeymoon effect of the Prime Minister's popularity were used by Lafay (1991) and Courbis (1995) . There was no honeymoon variable common to all Presidents or to all Prime Ministers; on the other hand, dummy variables taking into account Prime Minister's changes for the honeymoon effect of the Prime Minister's popularity were used by Lafay (1991) and Courbis (1995) . Lewis-Beck (1980) used a variable for the depreciation of popularity (equals to time) common to all Presidents; on the other hand, for the Prime Minister, Lewis-Beck (1980) built a variable equal to the opposite of time because Prime Ministers were relatively little known at the time of their appointment. Bellucci and Lewis-Beck (2010) did not use this variable but their study was made over a more recent period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Boya et al. (2010) showed the significant influence of the depreciation of popularity for the Prime Minister but not for the President and the party in government. Courbis (1995) used a variable for depreciation of the President's popularity for Mitterrand (Mitterrand I and Mitterrand II) in his study on the President's popularity (1971Q3-1994Q3) and a variable for the depreciation of popularity for some Prime Ministers (Barre, Mauroy and Cresson) in his study on the Prime Minister's popularity (1971Q2-1994Q3) . The advantage to use different dummy variables for the Presidents and the Prime Ministers is to make better ex post forecasts but the inconvenience is not making a general estimation and thus it is more difficult to make ex ante forecasts. Bellucci and Lewis-Beck (2010) used a square of time variable, which was a way for taking into account the positive influence of the closeness of the elections on the Prime Minister's popularity. Courbis (1995) used a dummy variable taking into account the high popularity of Balladur and dummy variables taking into account some Prime Minister changes (Mauroy, Rocard and Bérégovoy) in his study on the Prime Minister's popularity. Lafay (1977 Lafay ( , 1981 , used dummy variables to take into account the various popularity levels dependent on personal factors during the action of every Prime Minister.
The "rally around the flag" variable was not frequently used as it was in the United States. Hellwig (2007) used an events variable (positive and negative events). Boya et al. (2010) used a variable for the periods of wars (Gulf war I, Kosovo, intervention in Côte-d'Ivoire): a significant variable for the President's popularity but not for the Prime Minister's popularity. In most of articles, the influence of every event was individually taken into account. In Courbis (1995) , the Gulf war (international political event) had a significant positive influence on the President's popularity. Auberger (2001) showed the significant positive influence of the 1998 football world cup on the President's and Prime Minister's popularity. The political situation can also have an influence on the President's popularity: in Hibbs (1981) , the bad relations between Giscard d'Estaing and Chirac had a significant negative influence on the President's popularity; in Lecaillon (1984) , the union of the Left had a significant influence on the President's popularity. 7 In Lafay and Servais (2000) , scandals had a significant negative influence on the popularity of the political parties.
8 Dubois (2005) showed that the strikes of the end of 2005 had a significant negative influence on the Prime Minister's popularity. Decisions of economic policy had effects on the President's popularity: in Lafay (1984) and Courbis (1995) , the Barre's plan had a significant negative influence; and in Courbis (1995) , the announcement of the Mauroy government's austerity measures had a significant negative influence.
The popularity function, the economy and voters' behaviour
The popularity functions have an economic part and a political part. 9 The use of an autoregressive model of order 1 was theoretically justified by Kirchgässner (1985) and was used in numerous studies as for example: Kirchgässner (1985 Kirchgässner ( , 1991 for Germany, Neck and Karbuz (1997) for Austria, and Veiga and Veiga (2004) for Portugal. We supposed that voters have a sociotropic and a retrospective 10 behaviour: voters evaluate the economic performances with the general economic situation and they behave according to the responsibility hypothesis of Paldam (1981) , that is the parliamentary majority is rewarded for good economic performances and punished for bad economic performances with inverse consequences for the parliamentary opposition; it corresponds to the "reward-punishment" behaviour of Key (1966) .
11 Voters are not myopic because they don't only take into account the recent economic situation.
Voters are often supposed to behave as in a closed economy and they only take into account the national economic situation (see estimations, table 1). We can also suppose that voters take into account the degree of openness of the economy as Hellwig and Samuels (2007) made it to study the vote for a sample of 75 countries over 27 years. There are two models (two hypotheses): "the government constraint hypothesis: openness reduces voter tendencies to hold incumbent policy makers responsible" 12 and, in this hypothesis, we assume that voters have an unfounded degree of ignorance and "the government competence hypothesis: the interaction of the economy with openness should show no effect or even be positive" and, in this hypothesis, we assume that voters are sophisticated and that the government has the capacity to influence the economic situation under globalization (see estimations, table 2).
13 For the estimations in table 3, we suppose that voters take into account the difference between the national and the global economic situation. In this case, the government has the capacity to influence the economy within globalization and must have better economic performances than the global economy. This third hypothesis is strong because voters are better informed about the national economic situation than about the global economic situation. Take into account the global economic situation is a way to distinguish the luck from the competence. Then in section 5, we study if voters are sophisticated. As Maloney and Pickering (2015) explained it in their study on the vote for a sample of countries, "sophiticated voters like trend growth, but dislike dislike the volatility associated with any deviation from trend-be it positive or negative" and naive voters like raw growth. Similarly, we can say that sophiticated voters like low unemployment and inflation rates (or decrease in the unemployment and inflation rates) but dislike the volatility associated with any deviation from trend.
Estimations
We used over the period 1981Q2-2014Q4 an autoregressive model of order 1. The dependent variable is: POPLR equal to POPL -POPR: the difference between the popularity of the Left (the percentage of people having a good opinion of the Socialist party) and the popularity of the Right. 14, 15, 16, 17 10 According to Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) , voters have more retrospective behaviour than forward-looking behaviour but the difference between these two models is weak. 11 On the other hand, Hibbs (1981 Hibbs ( ,1982 found that voters take into account the economic performances of those in power in a relative way by comparing them with the previous in power. 12 In that case, the higher (resp. lower) the degree of openness of the economy, the smaller influence (resp. larger) the national economic situation has on popularity (see estimations, table 2). 13 The results of Hellwig and Samuels (2007) seem favourable for "the government constraint hypothesis" but it would be necessary to compare these results with those obtained with an estimation with economic variables (without the interaction of the economy with openess). 14 The average of the percentages of people having a good opinion of the UDF and the RPR parties for 1982Q4- The independent variables are economic or political variables.
When we don't take into account the global economic situation (estimations 1 to 3a), we use the independent economic variables UNEML, INFL and GDPL or their first difference (Δ) or their fourth difference (Δ4): UNEMNL is equal to UNEMN when the Left is the parliamentary majority and UNEMNL is equal to -UNEMN when the Right is the parliamentary majority, UNEMN is the quarterly national unemployment rate (quarterly average, France, OECD, csa) 18 and we are expecting a negative influence of the independent unemployment variable on the dependent popularity variable (POPLR); INFLL is equal to INFL when the Left is the parliamentary majority and INFLL is equal to -INFL when the Right is the parliamentary majority, INFL is the quarterly national inflation rate (quarterly average, France, OECD, csa) and we are expecting a negative influence of the independent inflation variable on the dependent popularity variable (POPLR), GGDPL is equal to GGDP when the Left is the parliamentary majority and GGDPL is equal to -GGDP when the Right is the parliamentary majority, GGDP is the annual growth rate (France, OECD, csa) and we are expecting a positive influence of the independent growth variable on the dependent popularity variable (POPLR).
HMLR2, ELEC and CONG are the independent political variables. HMLR2 is an honeymoon variable equal to 2 during the first quarter after the appointment of a left-wing Prime Minister after a victory in the presidential election or in the legislative elections (1988Q2 and 1997Q2) and equal to 1 during the second quarter after the appointment of a left-wing Prime Minister after a victory in the French presidential election or in the French legislative election (1988Q3 and 1997Q3) , equal to -2 during the first quarter after the appointment of a right-wing Prime Minister after a victory in the French presidential elections or in the French legislative elections (1986Q2, 1993Q2, 1995Q2, 2002Q2 and 2007Q2) and equal to -1 during the second quarter after the appointment of right-wing Prime Minister after a victory in the French presidential election or in the French legislative election (1986Q3, 1993Q3, 1995Q3, 2002Q3 and 2007Q3) . We expect positive effects of the honeymoon on the popularity of the party in power. ELEC is an electoral variable equal to 1 in 1998Q2, 2004Q2 and 2010Q2 after the 1998, 2004 and 2010 When we take into account the global economic situation (estimations 4 to 9a), we use the following independent economic variables UNEMLOE, INFLOE and GDPLOE or their first difference (Δ) or their fourth difference (Δ4) for the estimations (4) to (6a): OE is equal to the ratio between the sum of the exports and imports and the GDP (INSEE data), UNEMNLOE is equal to UNEMNL×OE and we are expecting a positive influence of this independent unemployment variable (naive voters) or no influence or negative influence (sophisticated voters) on the dependent popularity variable (POPLR), INFLLOE is equal to INFLL×OE and we are expecting a positive influence of this independent inflation variable (naive voters) or no influence or negative influence (sophisticated voters) on the dependent popularity variable (POPLR), GDPLOE equals to GDPL×OE and we are expecting a negative influence (naive voters) or no influence or positive influence (sophisticated voters) of this independent unemployment variable on the dependent popularity variable (POPLR); OEL is equal to OE when the Left is the parliamentary majority and OEL is equal to -OE when the Right is the parliamentary majority.
We use the following independent economic variables for the estimations (7) to (9a): UNEMNL -UNEMNLGE, INFLL -INFLLGE, GDPL -GDPLGE or their first difference (Δ) or their fourth difference (Δ4). We are expecting a negative influence of this independent unemployment variable, a negative influence of this independent inflation variable, a positive influence of this independent growth variable on the dependent popularity variable, (POPLR).
When we supposed that vote do not take into account the global economic situation, we obtained the following estimations over the 1981Q2-2014Q4 period (table 1): Estimations (1), (2a) and (3a) have nearly the same statistical indicators. All the estimations show that, when voters do not take into account the global economic situation, unemployment has a significant influence on the popularity while inflation and economic growth only have a significant influence in the estimation (1). According to the estimation (1), an increase (resp. a decrease) in the national unemployment rate of 1 point leads to a decrease (resp. increase) in the POPLR popularity rating by about 0.16 point a quarter later and leads to a decrease (resp. increase) in the POPLR popularity rating of 0.69 point over two years. According to the estimations (2a) and (3a), a quarterly / an annual change in the national unemployment rate of 0.10 / 0.40 point leads to a decrease in the POPLR popularity rating by about 0.50 / 0.57 point a quarter later and leads to a decrease (resp. increase) in the POPLR popularity rating of 2.00 / 2.27 points over two years.
When we take into account the openness of the economy, we obtain the following estimations over the 1981Q2-2014Q4 period (table 2): Estimations (4a), (5a) and (6a) have nearly the same statistical indicators but those of the estimations (4a) and (5a) are very slightly more satisfactory. Estimation (4a) shows favourable results for sophisticated voters. Estimation (5a) shows that, when voters take into account the openness of the economy, the quarterly change of the unemployment rate has a significant influence on the popularity: a quarterly change in the national unemployment rate of 0.10 point leads to a decrease in the POPLR popularity rating by about 0.54 point a quarter later and leads to a decrease (resp. increase) in the POPLR popularity rating of 2.23 points over two years (calculate with OE = 0.40 19 ); and we also obtain favourable results for the sophisticated voters hypothesis by comparing this result with that of the estimation (2a). Estimation (6a) shows that the annual change in the economic growth rate has a significant influence on the popularity. According to the estimations (6a), an annual change in the growth of 0.50 point leads to an increase in the POPLR popularity rating by about 0.21 point a quarter later and leads to a decrease (resp. increase) in the POPLR popularity rating of 0.80 point over two years (calculate with OE = 0.40); it is not possible to compare this result with that of the estimation (3a) and we can not say if this result is favourable for the naive voters or the sophisticated voters hypothesis. Estimations (7a), (8a) and (9a) have nearly the same statistical indicators but those of the estimation (8a) are very slightly more satisfactory. Estimation (8a) shows that, when voters take into account the global economic situation, the quarterly change of the unemployment rate has a significant influence on the popularity while the economic growth rate alone has a significant influence in the estimation (7a). According to the estimation (8a), a quarterly change in the national unemployment rate of 0.10 point leads to a decrease in the POPLR popularity rating by about 0.47 point a quarter later and leads to a decrease (resp. increase) in the POPLR popularity rating of 1.74 points over two years.
Among all the estimations, the estimations (1), (4a) and (5a) have slightly the most satisfactory statistical indicators but we do not clearly show the interest for taking into account the openess of the economy. 21 We also note that the estimated coefficient of the unemployment variable is nearly the same in the estimations (2a) and (8a).
When we study the hypothesis of asymmetric behaviour, 22 we obtained the following estimations over the period 1981Q2-2014Q4 (tables 4 and 5): The results are not favourable to the hypothsesis of asymetric behaviour because only the estimated coefficients of the ABSΔ4INFL t-1 and ABSΔ4GDPL t-1 independent variables have the expected sign but these estimated coefficients are not significantly different from 0 at the statistical level of 10 %. We build the following popularity-function for the French political parties:
Where TRUNEMNL is equal to TRUNEMN when the Left is the parliamentary majority and is equal to -TRUNEMN when the Right is the parliamentary majority, CYUNEMNL is equal to CYUNEMN when the Left is the parliamentary majority and equals to -CYUNEMN when the Right is the parliamentary majority, | | is the absolute value of the CYUNEMNL variable; GTRLPRIL is equal to GTRLPRI when the Left is the parliamentary majority and is equal to -GTRLPRI when the Right is the parliamentary majority, GTRPRI is the growth rate of the trend of the quarterly price index, calculated with the logarithm of the price index (csa): GTRPRI t = 100×(TRLPRI t -TRLPRI t-4 ); GTRLGDPL is equal to GTRLGDP when the Left is the parliamentary majority and equals to -GTRLGDP when the Right is the parliamentary majority, GTRLGDP is the growth rate of the trend of the quarterly gross domestic product: GTRGDP t = 100×(TRLGDP t -TRLGDP t-4 ).
POPLR t = β 0 + β 1 POPLR t-1 + β 2 TRUNEMNLOE t-1 + β 3 CYUNEMNLOE t-1 + β 4 |CYUNEMNLOE −1 | + β 5 GTRPRILOE t-1 + β 6 GCYPRILOE t-1 + β 7 | CYPRILOE −1 | + β 8 TRGDPLOE t-1 + β 9 CYGDPLOE t-1 + β 10 |CYGDPLOE −1 | + β 11 HMLR2 + β 12 ELEC + β 13 CONG +  t (2) For each independent economic variable, OE signifies that each independent economic variable is multiplied by the OE variable and for example: TRUNEMNLOE is equal to TRUNEMNL×OE.
POPLR t = γ 0 + γ 1 POPLR t-1 + γ 2 TR(UNEMNL -UNEMNLWE) t-1 + γ 3 CY(UNEMNL -UNEMNLWE) t-1 + γ 4 |(UNEMNL − UNEMNLWE) −1 | + γ 5 TR(LPRIL -LPRILWE) t-1 + γ 6 CY(LPRIL -LPRIWE) t-1 + γ 7 |CY(LPRIL − LPRILWE) −1 | + γ 8 GTR(LGDPL -LGDPLWE) t-1 + γ 9 GCY(LGDPL -LGDPLWE) t-1 + γ 10 |GCY(LGDPL − LGDPLWE) −1 | + γ 11 HMLR2 + γ 12 ELEC + γ 13 CONG +  t (3) For each independent economic variable, we take into account the difference between the national economic situation and the global economic situation.
We are expecting the following signs for the estimated coefficients:  2 < 0,  3 < 0 (naive voters),  3 > 0 (sophisticated voters),  4 > 0 (sophisticated voters),  5 < 0,  6 < 0 (naive voters),  6 > 0 (sophisticated voters),  7 > 0 (sophisticated voters),  8 > 0,  9 > 0 (naive voters),  9 < 0 (sophisticated voters),  10 < 0 (sophisticated voters). The same applies for the estimated coefficients β i et γ i .
We also make some estimations with the first difference (∆) and the fourth difference (∆4) for the independent economic variables.
We hold the following estimations over the period 1981Q2-2014Q4 (tables 6 to 8): 23, 24 Estimations (16), (17) and (18) have nearly the same statistical indicators. The estimated coefficients which are signicantly different of 0 at the statistical level of 10% have the expected sign. We note that the trend of five economic independent variables (trend of three unemployment independent variables) have a significative influence while only the absolute value of the cycle of the price index has a significant influence on the popularity variable. The statistical indicators of the estimations (16), (17) and (18) are slightly more satisfactory than those of the estimations (1), (2) and (3). These results are slightly favourable for the sophisticated voters hypothesis. The estimated coefficients of the TRUNEMNL t-1 , ΔTRUNEMNL t-1 , Δ4TRUNEMNL t-1 independent variables are equal to about twice those of 23 We only indicated the estimations with the estimated coefficients different from 0 at the statistical level of 10 %. 24 We also made estimations with the UNEML t-1 , …, UNEMLOE t-1 , …, (UNEML -UNEMLWE) t-1 , …, independent economic variables and we obtained fairly similar results with a few differences: GCYLNGDPL t-1 , ΔCYUNEML t-1 , ΔCYUNEMLOE t-1 are independent significant variables. the UNEMNL t-1 , ΔUNEMNL t-1 , Δ4UNEMNL t-1 independent variables (in absolute value) and it shows that the influence of unemployment is greater in estimations (16), (17) Estimations (19), (20) and (21) have nearly the same statistical indicators. The estimated coefficients which are signicantly different from 0 at the statistical level of 10% have the expected sign. We note that the trend of five economic independent variables (trend of three unemployment independent variables) have a significative influence while only the absolute value of the cycle of the price index has a significant influence on the popularity variable. The statistical indicators of estimations (19), (20) and (21) are slightly more satisfactory than those of estimations (4a), (5a) and (6a). These results are also slightly favourable for the sophisticated voters hypothesis.
By taking into account the openess of the economy, we obtain very similar results with those of the table 6. 26 We do not clearly show the interest for taking into account the openess of the economy. (17) and (20) which have the most satisfactory SC. These results are slightly favourable for the hypothesis of sophisticated voters but we do not show clearly that it is necessary to take into account the openness of the economy.
Conclusion
In this article, we build, and estimate a popularity function for the French political parties over the period 1981Q2-2014Q4 (quarterly data). We suppose that voters have a retrospective behaviour according to the responsibility hypothesis and we study if voters are naive or sophisticated. We compare the obtained results between a closed economy, an opened economy by taking account the openness and an open economy by taking account the global economy. The most often statistically significant economic variable is unemployment. We do not clearly show the interest for taking into account the openess of the economy because with the openess of the economy, the statistical indicators are only slightly more satisfactory. These first results (section 4) are slightly favourable for the the sophisticated voters hypothesis. We also found unfavourable results for the asymmetry hypothesis (tables 4 and 5). In section 5 (tables 6 to 8), we also find slightly favourable results for the hypothesis of sophisticated voters by making a trend-cycle decomposition for each economic variable as Maloney and Pickering (2015) did it in their study of economic voting. Similarly (see section 4), we do not clearly show the interest to take into account the openess of the economy.
For future research, we shall also make estimates to try to explain the President's popularity and the Prime Minister's popularity over the 1981-2014 period. It is notably interesting to compare the influence of the economic and political variables on the President's and the Prime Minister's popularity.
